Of necessity, many tests for political influence on policies or outcomes involve the use of dummy variables. However, it is often the case that the hypothesis against which the political dummies are tested is the null hypothesis that the intercept is otherwise constant throughout the sample. This simple null can cause inference problems if there are (non political) intercept shifts in the data and the political dummies are correlated with these un-modeled shifts. Here we present a method for more rigorously testing the significance of political dummy variables in single equation models estimated with time series data. Our method is based on recent work on detecting multiple regime shifts by Bai and Perron. The paper illustrates the potential problem caused by an overly simple null hypothesis, exposits the Bai and Perron model, gives a proposed methodology for testing the significance of political dummy variables and illustrates the method with two examples.
I.
Introduction
The interaction between politics and economic policymaking is an important and fascinating study. Much has been learned from the many papers using political variables to help predict the time path of economic variables (and vice versa) . However, there is a large potential statistical problem in much of the literature that is seldom discussed, namely the frequent absence of a well-defined null hypothesis to the posited pattern of political influence. Of necessity, political information often enters time series models as a group of dummy variables. Often the null hypothesis is simply that the chosen political dummies are insignificant and the alternative is that politics "matters". Note that the null hypothesis implicitly embraces a constant intercept throughout the sample.
However, there may be significant intercept shifts in the sample that are not caused by the political factors under investigation. In this case, if the political events are correlated with the excluded true breakpoints, they will tend to achieve statistical significance, even though they are, in reality, not. In some sense this is just a simple omitted variable story, but in another sense it is a potential challenge to any set of results that concludes politics matters by comparing the statistical significance of political change dummies to that of a fixed intercept.
In this paper we outline a method to provide a more stringent null hypothesis from which to test the importance of politics. The first step is to determine the number, location and confidence intervals for intercept shifts in the sample via time series techniques. In particular, we employ the methods recently developed by Bai & Perron (1998 , 2001 .
Given these statistically optimal breakpoints, the significance of political dummy variables can then be considered in two separate stages. If the political dummies imply the same number of intercept shifts that are found by the time series methods, and these political shifts fall inside the confidence intervals of the time series shifts, then one has an extremely strong case for the argument that politics fundamentally matters. If some of the politically derived shifts match up with time series shifts, the case is weakened, but potentially sustainable.
If none of the political shift points line up with the time series break dates, then it is difficult to make the case that political factors cause major movements in the variable under study. However, they may still matter in the following sense. One can take the time series breakpoints as given, and test to see whether the political dummies have any incremental explanatory power. That is to say, even though politics may not be causing large changes in the behavior of the variable, they do cause statistically significant changes, even when the larger changes are taken into account. Even this second type of demonstration would be a much more compelling argument in favor of the importance of politics than the common practice of simply testing political dummies against an otherwise fixed intercept.
In what follows below, we describe in more detail the statistical problem, present a method for statistically determining the optimal breakpoints based on the work of Bai & Perron, describe our suggested methodology in more detail, and then apply this method to an investigation of the determinants of shifts in US and UK monetary policy as measured by shifts in the real interest rate.
1 Hansen (2001) explains the general problem with the Chow procedure, which is that the potential breakpoint is chosen exogenously by the researcher. Andrews (1993) developed a more rigorous way to test for parameter instability and structural changes. He considers the supremum of all the possible Wald (Sup-Wald) test statistics and computes the asymptotic critical values necessary to test for the optimal location of a structural break and compare it to the null of no break.
II.
The importance of a realistic null hypothesis 
But instead, the researcher estimates the following incorrect model consisting of an intercept and an incorrect intercept shift represented by the dummy variable DP as shown in equation 2 below.
The null hypothesis embodied in equation 2, that β 1 equals zero, implies that the null model is a fixed intercept with no other shift allowed. Under this incorrect null, the coefficient β 1 in equation 2, whose true value is zero, will have a nonzero expected value that is given by equation 3 below:
Equation 3 shows that the size and sign of the estimated coefficient will depend on the true coefficient on the correct variable, the correlation between the spurious and correct variables, and the relative volatilities of the variables.
If the researcher had instead tested the significance of dummy variable DP in a model that included D*, (i.e. had estimated equation 4 below) the expected value of the
coefficient on DP would have been zero.
We have concocted a simple empirical example of this phenomenon. We construct an artificial data series with 160 quarterly observations according to the following equation:
y(t) = 6.5 + 2*Shift(t) + e(t)
Shift is a dummy variable that raises the mean for 40 observations (i.e. 10 years) in the middle of the sample and the e(t)'s are independent draws from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0.5. The series is displayed in Figure 1 . To further illustrate, we use the dummy shown in Figure 2 along with 4 other dummy variables that are correlated to different degrees with the true intercept shift.
These correlations range from 0.33 to 0.73 as reported in column one of Table 1 .
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the size and significance of these spurious dummy variables when they are estimated via OLS under the incorrect null of no other possible shift, while column 4 shows the size and significance of the same dummy variables when estimated using a simple correction for first order autocorrelation in the errors under the incorrect null. Finally, the fifth column of the table shows the size and significance of these spurious dummies under the correct null, which is the null that allows for the true intercept shift. The results for the particular dummy graphed in Figure 2 appear in the fourth row of Table 1 .
We can see that even when correcting the standard errors for general heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors, these 5 spurious dummies are positive and significant at the 0.05 level or better, with the size of their coefficients and tstatistics being positive functions of their correlation with the true, excluded dummy.
When estimated with a correction for first order serial correlation, the last three dummies (those most highly correlated with the true dummy) are positive and significant at the 0.01 level, the second dummy is positive and significant at the 0.10 level and the first dummy is not statistically significant. Finally, as seen in column five, when the true dummy is included in the regression (i.e. the correct null hypothesis is imposed), the spurious dummies all have much smaller and insignificant coefficients.
The foregoing discussion is just a simple illustration of our overall point: In order to have confidence in the reported significance of political dummy variables, there needs to be a realistic null hypothesis under consideration when significance tests are performed. In the next section we consider using statistical methods to determine the number and location of breakpoints in a series, and how this information can be used to create more stringent tests for the significance of political dummy variables.
2 The endogenous determination of breakpoints has been an important research topic in empirical macroeconomics since Perron's (1989) demonstration that standard Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are sensitive to allowing for intercept and/or trend shifts (see Zivot and Andrews (1992) , and Perron (1997) ).
III. Multiple Structural Change Models
In a recent series of papers Bai and Perron (1998 , 2001 ) develop methods to test for and estimate multiple structural changes in stationary time series.
2 The Bai and Perron (BP) methodology has the advantage of allowing the breakpoints to be determined endogenously rather than being chosen, a priori, by the statistical analyst. In addition, unlike the Chow test, the CUSUM procedure of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) , or the work of Andrews (1993) , the BP methodology allows for possible multiple breaks to be uncovered. Finally, BP methods allow testing for significant breaks in subsets of parameters (partial multiple break models) rather than being forced to test for the stability of all coefficients jointly.
Here we present a simple (intercept shift only) version of Bai and Perron (1998) .
However, it is important to note that the procedure is in no way limited to this simple case.
There can be other variables in the model and their coefficients can either be subject to shifts or remain constant over the sample depending on the choice of the investigator. We present this simple case for ease of exposition using the following multiple linear regression with m breakpoints (m+ 1 regimes):
y t = C 1 Z t1 + E t ; t = 1; 2; :::; T1 y t = C 2 Z t2 + E t ; t = T1 + 1; :::; T2 :
:
3 The Bai-Perron (1998) procedure corrects for serial correlation and different variances across segments by incorporating Andrews (1991) robust standard errors. All break models we employ in this paper utilize this correction. y t = C j Z tm+1 + E t ; t = Tm + 1; :::; T According to this specification, y t is the observed dependent variable at time t; z t ={1}, C j (j = 1; 2; :::;m+ 1) are coefficients (the value of the constant for each regime); and E t is the disturbance term. The break points (T1; :::; Tm),are explicitly treated as unknown. We seek to estimate the unknown regression coefficients together with the break points. This allows us to test for structural changes in the mean of the series. 
)
is the sum of squared residuals. Using the estimated breakpoints the parameter estimates found are .
The break values can depend upon the imposition of the minimal length of a segment (h). This is determined by the value of the trimming parameter (E) that must be specified to estimate the model. Since E = h/T, a lower value of E implies a smaller minimum regime size. BP (1998) provide recommendations for E based on sample size and the maximum number of breakpoints allowed. The procedure searches all possible break dates and minimizes the difference between the restricted and unrestricted sum of squares over all the potential breaks. 4 Bai and Perron (1998, 2001) If the null of no break is rejected by the double maximum tests, BP next suggest a sequential supFt(L+1/L) procedure to determine the number of structural breaks. The statistic tests the null of L breaks against the alternative of L+1breaks. Rejection in favor of a model with L+1 breaks occurs if the overall minimum value of the sum of squared residuals is sufficiently smaller than the sum of squared residuals from the l breaks model. 5 Critical values for these tests are found in Bai & Perron (1998 , 2001 . 6 Two final methods, the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Schwartz' Criteria (LWZ), have also been proposed as additional ways of determining breakdates. However, Bai and Perron(2001) show using Monte Carlo experiments, that the The number of break dates selected are the number associated with the overall minimum error sum of squares. 5 Finally, estimates of the break dates need not be the global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals. A sequential procedure can also be used to select the number of breaks in which if an initial break is found, (based on the initial SupF T (1) test) the sample is then divided into subgroups at the breakpoint, and the same parameter constancy test is then performed on the sub-samples. The partitioning of the subsamples continues until the parameter constancy test fails to reject the null. Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 ) are able to develop a method to compute confidence intervals for the sequential breakpoints by employing a novel asymptotic theory that assumes the magnitudes of the breaks decline as the sample size increases.
A useful check on the number of breaks found using the sequential method is supplied by Bai's (1997) repartition estimation procedure. Starting with T -consistent estimates of from the sequential procedure is re-estimated using the
and is re-estimated using . Cases where these estimators
(call them and ) reveal the same number and location of breakdates provides us
with additional confidence in our results based on the sequential procedure.
6 sequential procedure works better than these alternatives and we thus do not explore them here.
7 Variables that have a unit root (or stochastic trend) have population parameters (mean or variance) that are time dependent. Since it is well known that correlations between independent non-stationary time series can often be spurious, variables must be rendered stationary prior to being used for parameter estimation and hypothesis testing.
In sum, the BP methods can be used to test for the existence of structural breaks, along with the number and location of those breaks. Confidence intervals on the break dates can also be constructed. We argue that this method imposes a needed reality check on the true significance of political dummy variables that are often included in regressions where the intercept is otherwise constant.
IV. A Proposed methodology for evaluating the significance of political dummy variables in time series equations
In this section, we outline the steps involved for testing the significance of political dummy variables in time series equations using the BP methods described above. The first step is to determine whether the variables under consideration are stationary. 
8 Both real interest rates we investigate in this paper were overwhelmingly found to be breakpoint stationary using the ZA procedure. This finding is consistent with many recent studies on real rates (see Garcia and Perron (1996) and Caporale and Grier (2000) ).
where the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root (*=0) is tested against the alternative of stationarity ( *<0). The number of lags in the ADF regression must be determined by some criterion. A common choice is to use the number of lags that minimize the value of the Akaike information criteria (AIC).
The ADF test can also be modified by allowing for an alternative hypothesis in which the series contains a deterministic trend. The appropriate ADF regression becomes:
and the computed ADF statistic is the OLS t-statistic testing *=0 against *<0.
However, for present purposes, standard ADF tests are problematic. Zivot and Andrews (ZA) (1992) explain that these tests can be misleading (fail to reject a false null), if the time series undergo discrete structural changes, which is exactly the situation we are studying. They demonstrate that adding level and/or trend shifts to ADF equations lower the chances of falsely concluding that a break or trend break stationary series is nonstationary.
8
Their procedure involves altering the standard ADF test by estimating:
where (8) indicates the potential breakpoint in the time series and DU t denotes a level shift that equals 1 at and after the breakpoint and zero before. The unit root test is then the T-statistic evaluating the null of *=0 (nonstationary) against *<0 (break stationary) using new critical values 9 In addition, the test can also be performed by interacting the trend with the breakpoint dummy and by allowing both an intercept and a trend shift. ZA provide critical values for these alterative tests as well.
10 Once the maximum number of possible breaks to allow is determined, there is little need for concern regarding the properties of the error term. BP demonstrate that their results are consistent under fairly weak conditions allowing for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. In addition, BP allow estimation of confidence intervals for the parameters in the model (whether or not all they are allowed to change) using a Andrews (1991) HAC estimator. supplied by ZA. They propose estimating the model for every possible (8) and choose the one that minimizes the t-statistic on the coefficient *.
9
Once we resolve the stationarity question, we next turn to estimating parameters and breakpoints. To begin, an initial trimming percentage (,) must be specified in order to ensure a reasonable amount of degrees of freedom to calculate an initial error sum of squares. For example, if ,=.15, then breaks will be considered for the middle seventy percent of the sample. BP's Gauss breakpoint program allows for ,=.05, .10, .15, .20, .25.
The trimming specification determines the maximum possible number of breaks as well as the minimum regime size. For instance, when ,=.10 the maximum number of breaks is 8 since allowing 9 breaks forces the break dates to be exactly at ten percent intervals (.1, .2, ....9). When ,=.15 the maximum (M) number of breaks is 5; M=3 for ,=.20 and M=2 for .25. Therefore, for a series with sample =100 quarters and ,=.15, there is a maximum of 5 breaks (6 regimes) where each regime has a minimum length of 15 quarters. 10 Bai and Perron (1998, 2001) argue that the global and sequential supF t (L+1/L) tests provide the most reliable estimates of the number and location of the break dates. Clearly, the strongest evidence would involve both methods yielding the same answers. In cases 11 A divergence can occur in the case where the SupF t (1) test is insignificant but the SupF t (2) test rejects zero breaks in favor of 2. The sequential procedure will then stop at zero breaks whereas the global SupF t (2/1) test may suggest a two break model. where they disagree, BP (1998) suggest the global procedure should be used for any model with more than one significant break. Even if the political breaks are not closely related to the BP regime shifts, they may still be statistically significant and important variables. One can allow for this possibility by testing whether, taking the time series shift points as given, the political dummy variables have any incremental explanatory power.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to accomplish this is via Davidson &
McKinnon's J-test methodology for non-nested hypothesis testing. This allows us to test 12 A few examples include Hibbs (1977) , Beck (1982) , Alesina & Sachs(1988) , Hakes (1990) , Grier (1991 Grier ( , 1996 , and Krause (1994) . The effect of political changes on monetary policy is an important and long studied subject that of necessity often uses dummy variables to test for political effects. Papers using this method routinely appear in top journals in both economics and political science. 12 Of course, there are many (all imperfect) ways to measure monetary policy.
Given the decline in correlation between monetary aggregates and economic outcomes, a consensus has emerged in favor of using a short term interest rate as the policy measure.
Yet nominal interest rates can be misleading policy indicators without controlling for 13 For a further discussion, see Caporale & Grier (1998) .
14 These are the exact same dates reported in Caporale & Grier 2000 . Also note that for both our US and UK real rate results, the repartition method produced the identical number, location, and confidence intervals for the break dates as the sequential procedure.
inflation. That is to say an 8% interest rate in a zero inflation environment is indicative of restrictive policy, but that same rate in a period of 10% inflation is not at all restrictive. 
A. US real rate breakpoints
We begin by re-estimating their model using a longer sample for the US. We use a quarterly sample of 156 observations from 1961.1 through 1999.4. The real interest rate is taken from the St. Louis Fed FRED database and is defined as the three month treasury bill rate minus the inflation rate calculated using the CPI. Figure 3 displays the data.
As shown in Table 2 , the two general tests for the presence of structural breaks, the UDmax and Wdmax tests are both significant at the 0.01 level. We consider finding the optimal number of breaks by using both the supF (L+1 | L) tests and the sequential procedure. In both cases, four breaks are chosen with dates of 1967.2, 1973.1, 1980.3, and 1986.2. 14 These breakpoints are fairly tightly estimated; the 95% confidence intervals are 1966. 1 -1969.2, 1971.4 -1973.2, 1980.1 -1981.1, and 1985.1 -1987.3 . These results are reported in Table 2 . As can be seen by comparing the dates in Table 3 with the confidence intervals in Table 2 House and Senate change in 1995.1. However, these last two omissions may not be surprising as they happen very close to each other and intuitively, we might expect the two changes to offset each other.
By contrast, each change of the Chairmanship of the Fed occurred outside the confidence intervals for the structural breaks. This is a striking result, as it shows that despite popular belief, large changes in monetary policy are not largely determined by changes in Fed leadership.
Given the co-incidence of the BP breakpoints and political changes, we believe that there is a significant effect of large political changes on the real interest rate. In this subsection, we go on to consider whether, given the null hypothesis of breakpoints only at the dates uncovered by the Bai & Perron procedures, there is any additional evidence of political influence on the US real interest rate. That is to say, we assume the BP breakpoints are NOT political and test to see if political changes achieve statistical 15 Our test can be recognized as one half of the so called J-test methodology of Davidson & Mackinnon (1981) .
significance taking the BP dates as given. We accomplish this by means of a non-nested hypothesis test.
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Columns 1 through 3 of table 3 report OLS regressions of the BP break dates, the party change break dates and the Fed Chair change break dates on the real interest rate. In column 4, the predicted values of the party change regression are used as an additional regressor in the BP break date regression. As can be seen, the resulting coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that even with this stringent null hypothesis, party change is a significant determinant of the real interest rate. By contrast, the predicted values from the Fed Chair regression are completely insignificant when added as an ancillary regressor to the BP break date regression, as shown in column 5 of table 3.
In sum then, the evolution of the US real interest rate is significantly influenced by changes in Party control of branches of the Federal government, but not by changes in the Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve. The structural breakpoints in the series are reasonably closely correlated with political changes, and, there is additional significant information carried in the political change dates beyond the information in the optimal breakpoints. Neither of these results obtain for the Fed Chair change dates.
B. The UK real rate breakpoints
We now turn our attention to the UK real interest rate. We use the same 1961.1 -1999.4 quarterly sample and again we define the real interest rate as the three month treasury bill rate minus inflation calculated using the CPI. In this case the raw data come 16 Using some relatively strong assumptions (relative purchasing power parity, the international Fisher effect, and uncovered interest parity), one can derive a real interest parity condition for international interest rates. This condition implies that single country real rates do not move independently of the "world" real rate. Real interest parity is seldom found in the data. from the International Monetary Fund's IFS CD-ROM. The UK real rate variable is displayed in Figure 4 . As shown in Table 5 , when we test for structural breaks in the mean using the BP UDmax and Wdmax tests, we reject the null hypothesis of no breaks at the 0.01 level. We again consider finding the optimal number of breaks by using both the supF (L+1 | L) tests and the sequential procedure. In both cases, three breaks are chosen, with dates of 1970 .4, 1980 .3 and 1993 .3. The 1980 Note that one of these breaks corresponds exactly to a US break, namely the one at 1980.3. The other two estimated UK break dates do not fall inside the confidence intervals for the US breaks. Thus, there is a significant amount of independent variation in the UK series and we are probably justified in treating it as a separate case. The UK case is less clear cut than the US case. There are 5 political regime shifts, two of which are in BP shift confidence intervals, but in neither of these cases is the political shift "close" to the exact BP breakpoint. Further, the most famous political shift in the sample, from Callahan to Thatcher, is not related to any BP shift. There are 4 Bank of England director shifts in the data, one of them coincides directly with a BP shift point and another falls inside a BP shift confidence interval but again is not very close to the estimated breakpoint. Neither set of changes relates to the real rate as well as does political change in the US, nor does one type of change dominate the other as was the case in the US.
We now consider whether taking the BP breakpoints as given, either Party Government change or Bank of England Director change has any additional, independent explanatory power for the UK real rate. Table 7 shows that neither the predictions of the Party change model nor the Bank of England change model have any significant explanatory power above and beyond the BP breakpoints. That is to say, the political and bureaucratic variables that are significant when tested against the null hypothesis of an otherwise fixed intercept are insignificant when tested against a null which includes the statistically optimal intercept shifts.
C. Discussion
Of the four sets of dummy variables studied (political change US, political change UK, Fed chair change US and Bank of England head change UK) all are significant against the null of a fixed intercept. None of these sets of dummy variables match up precisely to the statistically optimal intercept shifts uncovered by the BP methods used here, though the political change US dummies are reasonably close.
Further, only the political change US dummies are significant when tested against a null that includes the BP optimal breakpoints. These examples illustrate both the use of the BP methodology and the problems that can arise when testing for the influence of dummy variables against an overly simple null hypothesis.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we propose using the statistical methods of Bai & Perron to create more stringent tests for the influence of political dummy variables on time series data.
We show that the correlation between central bankers and monetary policy is more apparent that real in the US and UK, and that political change is an important determinant of monetary policy (as measured by short term real interest rates) in the US.
Our examples involve time series models of monetary policy with intercept shifts only. However, the technique applies more broadly. The methods can be used to uncover the number and location of breakpoints in slope coefficients in a model as well as just intercept shifts. We are currently working on extending our tests for political influence on monetary policy in this direction.
However, both the problem described and the method presented here have applications far beyond the study of monetary policy since political dummy variables are widely used in empirical research in the social sciences on topics like government spending, taxation, tariff rates, exchange rates and likely many others. In column 3, the first number is the classical t-statistic and the second number is the Newey-West t-statistic that is robust to general heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In columns 4 and 5 the numbers in parentheses are classical t-statistics. All estimations for this table were done using EVIEWS3.1 .58 All regressions are estimated using the Newey-West HAC corrected standard errors with lag truncation = 4. T-statistics in parentheses. .41 All regressions are estimated using the Newey-West HAC corrected standard errors with lag truncation = 4. T-statistics in parentheses. 
